N Brown cash leakage explained
Funding its customers
Lewis’ theory that N Brown is using cash to fund customer credit seems credible to me. And increased lending may be sufficient to explain why cash flows lag earnings over the last decade.
In 2011 the company had £519.6m in receivables (i.e. money owed by customers) on its balance sheet amounting to over half the company’s assets.
Net cash from operations fell from £91.7m to £54.7m mainly because of higher receivables, and another cash-eating policy: higher stock levels to improve customer service.
I suppose he’s right, the provision of credit is another income stream for N Brown, so while it depresses current cash inflows as the company extends more credit (two thirds of purchases are on store cards) and waits for the money to come in, come in most of it should. Last year income from credit was £195m, 27% of total revenues.
But I don’t like this income stream for two reasons:
- There are limits to how much N Brown can grow this way without getting more into debt, which would make me uncomfortable, or raising money from shareholders. Indeed there are limits to how much it can grow this way without putting its customers in too much debt. The provision for bad loans in 2011 was 7.4% of sales, down from 9% the previous year and…
- The interest rate on its store cards is 39.9%. I think they’re a bad product and some of the opprobrium reserved for pay-day loan companies and other non-standard credit providers should be shared with store cards charging predatory interest rates. Maybe one day the government will curb them, or maybe one day consumers will regulate their own behaviour.
It complicates the investment case. I wanted to add shares in a retailer but it’s also a finance company. N Brown is not unusual in diversifying this way, I suppose it’s a symptom of how competitive retailing is, but I don’t like it.
I haven’t yet made up my mind whether that’s a reason not to add a company that looks impressive in every other respect to the Thrifty 30 portfolio, but it’s cooled my passion and reaffirmed my predilection for simpler business models.
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Provision (charge or balance?) as a % of sales isn’t the best indicator. Do they publish the provision balance as % of the debt?
The high interest rate is a moral concern although with potential for good returns on the asset but the risk of non-payment in poor economic environment is not great. Store cards are one of the 1st item of credit to get non-payment. These days…. even before mobile contracts (which young things regard as non optional).
I also noticed in the annual accounts that a substantial chunk of debt is due to be renewed in Jan ’12.
Hi Bob. Thanks for your comment. It does, in the financial review. The bad debt provision was 8.7% of gross debtors, down from 9.5% in 2010.
The report contains a little detail about how the company tightened credit terms and asked for deposits on high priced items because of bad debts during the recession, which reduced sales but improved gross margins.
I’m not familiar with accounting for bad debt, so I’d be interested to know why the balance as a % of debt is a better measure than charge as a % of sales and for that matter why N Brown uses the latter primarily.
Richard,
Not an expert on bad debt at all but a data point worth considering. I’d look at the financials of UK credit card companies as a comparison.
I remember looking at Discover card a few years back when they owned Goldfish (maybe they still own it?) which was a higher interest rate credit card in the UK. If I remember correctly 5% was the non performing holders. So in light of that 8% is a bit higher which might indicate poor borrower quality?
Just a thought
Nate
Thanks Nate.
Richard, I’ll attempt to answer your question about why bad debt as a % of balances is a better than % of sales.
In summary, the difference is stock versus flow. Stock the total amount of lending and flow is the lending sales. Bad debt comes from the stock (ie the lending you have already done) and bad debt rates change over time. For example, bad debt rates on stock increase rapidly during recessions but as lenders tighten up the lending criteria at the same time they acquire the lower volume of higher quality lending at the same time (so bad debt of sales performance is better than bad debt of stock). Lenders have to hold capital against the stock rather than the flow.
So, bad debt as % of balances is best because it tells you about the quality of the full asset base.
I know nothing about this business so can only speculate why they report how they do!
Does this answer it?
Yes it does. Thank you
It may also explain why they use sales as the benchmark!
Pleasure. Generally in normal times bad debt of stock at around 10% is fairly normal for unsecured lending.
Neonomic covered it nicely. A question of stock verse flow. The levels of new business distort the metric.
For a comparison, check out Next for their bad debt provision (mature business in similar area).
Regarding the debt that, I assume, was renewed. I wonder if the rate changed?